From the first moments of her independence, India has been inspired by the same social-philosophical principles as Europe. India is a democratic state that observes the rule of law, and guarantees its citizens fundamental rights and freedoms. Throughout the period of independence, the Indian defence establishment has remained strictly apolitical. These and other similar characteristics create the preconditions for a dialogue, which would otherwise be difficult and perhaps impossible.

An equally important fundamental factor uniting India and Europe is a similar basic perception of international security, a striving to prevent conflicts from escalating into armed clashes and to resolve them through negotiation. In both cases, bitter historical experience forms the background to this view. There can be no doubting that a logical link exists between a democratic social system and this peaceful attitude.

Independent India brought a welcome combination of idealism and defence of national interests to international life. That feature of Indian foreign policy has been preserved to this very day. Finland and India have often found themselves on the same side of international disputes, especially at the UN.

When Europe was split in two during the Cold War decades, India maintained close relations with both halves of our continent. True to her Nehruvian view of the world, she refused to choose sides in the conflict between East and West and instead built a globally important role for herself in the leadership of the nonaligned movement. As early as 1949, Nehru described Indian foreign policy in the following terms:

"The main objectives of that policy are: the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or group of powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue, the liberation of subject peoples, the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual, the elimination of racial discrimination and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance, which afflict the greater part of the world's population.".

Except for the fact that "the liberation of subject peoples" has been accomplished, not a single word in this definition would need to be changed today. And that in spite of the fact that the pressure of world political events often forced both Nehru and his successors to seek cooperation with one or other group of powers.

It was over three decades ago that India established diplomatic relations with the European Union, to membership of which Finland acceded in 1995. She was among the first non-European countries to do so. That action was a demonstration of precisely the open-mindedness reflected in Nehru's goals as outlined in the extract from his speech that I have just quoted. That extension of a hand of friendship led to growing trade and institutional arrangements for facilitating cooperation, including broadly-based development cooperation with the EU Commission, a ministerial-level dialogue in 1982 and most recently the so-called third-generation cooperation agreement concluded in 1993. That agreement is founded on the democratic principles and respect for human rights that I have just referred to. The EU Commission document "Communication on India", which was published this year, rests on the same foundation. Finland, as an EU member, sees that document as a step towards broadening and diversifying dialogue between the Union and India. The worst obstacle to the development of good and mutually beneficial relations between the EU and India is the dearth of objective knowledge from which erroneous preconceived attitudes spring. Finland wishes to make her own active contribution to the EU-India dialogue. Viewed from our perspective, it is precisely EU membership that gives us a means of achieving closer relations with India in a way that would otherwise have been beyond our grasp.

The end of the Cold War has forced both India and the countries of Europe - on both sides of the old front lines - to ponder their international positions and basic strategies probably more profoundly than at any time since the end of the 1940s. A thorough change has taken place in Europe's security structures. A new structure to replace the old ones is only in the process of taking shape. Rapid change and uncertainty are the hallmarks of the situation today. The concept of security has also broadened to include the whole of the international agenda from disarmament to environmental problems and from terrorism to human rights. A comprehensive grasp is essential in security policy. It calls for more cooperation, both internationally and between different sectors within the same country, than has been practised in the past.

The fundamental values that both India and Europe share - democracy, the rule of law, human rights - have demonstrated their enduring character in the upheavals of recent years. There is no need to compromise on them; on the contrary, they must be strengthened. Everything that is human, including the practical application of these values to the life of society, is inevitably imperfect. In this respect, however, the greatest threat comes from those quarters that reject the universality of these values. A frequently-heard argument is that human dignity and everything that goes with it depend on a particular period, culture or set of societal traditions or are in some way subordinate to local values. However, those who advocate value relativism in this way most usually represent groups who would have something to lose if democracy, the rule of law and human rights were to be implemented in their societies.

A basic duty of states is to ensure the physical and political survival of their peoples. If a crisis is deep enough, everything else has only instrumental value. In times of historical transition, foreign policy definitions - even those on the level of principle - must be examined unemotionally against this criterion. In Finland's case, neutrality no longer has the same instrumental value that it had during the Cold War. Military non-alignment and an independent defence, combined with active participation in international crisis management, still form the foundation on which our security rests. Although the Non-Aligned Movement remains strong, a lively debate on the concept of non-alignment and the future role of the Movement in the post-Cold War world is ongoing. This debate is of global importance and we in Finland are following it with keen interest.

The question of disarmament and arms control changed its form once the Cold War had ended, but remains just as topical as before. Disarmament and measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons are the instruments by which the international community prevents conflicts and stops them spreading, also in post-Cold War conditions.

In Finland's view, the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty supports the ongoing positive development. Nuclear disarmament has at last become a reality and non-proliferation has been significantly strengthened. The CTBT strengthens a development that reduces the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. India's decision not to become a party to the treaty disappointed us, and is causing concern in an international community awaiting the entry into force of the treaty. Naturally, we respect India's sovereign right to make her own decision. In the situation that has arisen, open and direct dialogue is needed. We are prepared to listen to India's security concerns and I believe that this willingness is reflected more broadly in Europe and within the entire international community.

I want to emphasise that the accomplishment of the long-awaited CTBT does not at all mean that nuclear disarmament has been brought to its conclusion; on the contrary, it must be continued and non-proliferation must be further strengthened. The next step that we would like to see is a ban on the production of weapons-grade fissionable material. We also want existing commitments to reduce nuclear weapons honoured, and for those reductions to continue. That will create security for all of us, including Finland and India.

The Cold War masked a number of threats and conflicts to which the international community was unable to devote adequate attention, because a large part of its mental energy was being squandered in competition between the power blocs. The most important of them is the global threat arising from environmental change. In this, India and Europe share both a common interest and a common responsibility. Climate change, protecting biodiversity, or pollutants affect all of us just as much, although industrial Europe has caused several of those problems either directly or through the spread of technology invented there. Questions that are of fateful consequence to both India and Europe, i.e. those relating to the availability and adequacy of energy and water resources, are organically linked to the policy choices made with respect to environmental matters. It is precisely India's democratic character that makes her a natural partner for Europe in warding off this danger that threatens the whole of humankind.

India and Europe are likewise natural partners in averting the other threats that have sometimes been described collectively as "the new international agenda". By this I mean organised crime, including terrorism, drugs production and trafficking, money laundering, illegal immigration and corruption. Nor would I wish to fail to mention dangerous new epidemics, of which the HIV virus and AIDS are the most important example. All of those problems indiscriminately affect both India and Europe. Each and every one of them threatens the fundamental values that I have mentioned, and on which our political view of the world is founded. As a member of the European Union, Finland is already committed to supporting cooperation programmes in all of those areas. Europe expects full cooperation from India in these respects, not as a return favour, but in India's own interest.

The disappearance of the world order that prevailed during the Cold War era has been felt especially painfully in the sphere of economic and social development. Eastern Europe is still in the throes of severe changes that are putting the structures of society to the test. In both Finland and India, economic reforms gained a new impetus when their established trade partner the Soviet Union ceased to exist. At the same time, significant changes are happening in the structures of world trade, changes that are problematic from the the perspective of all states that depend on world trade. Where India is concerned, such changes feel difficult because you are in the process of altering your development strategy to give greater weight to exports and foreign investment. The matter is not made any easier by the fact that the new global trading system is far from ideal. The Indian diplomat Muchkund Dubey has described the situation after the Uruguay Round in the following terms:

"The international trading system that has emerged from the Uruguay Round is a combination of highly qualified and only partially liberal multilateralism, discriminatory regionalism and arbitrary unilateralism".

I would not have used those words myself, but I admit that it is not easy to argue against that definition. Perhaps what Churchill said about democracy is the best answer also here. He described democracy as the worst possible political system except for all the others.

I do not propose to begin going through the long and complex list of matters that await all of the World Trade Organisation's member countries, including India and Finland, once the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore has been held. I wish only to emphasise that behind the WTO list lie a number of fundamental, downright existential questions, to which humankind will have to try to find answers before it is too late.

In the search for those answers, I see many unavailed-of opportunities in a dialogue between democratic India and democratic Europe. By that I mean above all the question of what so-called development is; in other words, what kind of development we want and what kind of development is possible. Should the present developing countries industrialise following the same pattern as the South-East Asian tigers? If that is what is going to happen, what will it mean for the structure of society and natural resources? We use that innocent-sounding word "development" as though we knew what we were talking about, but the fact is that we have no generally accepted definition of development, any more than we have a theory of development. Economists must, naturally, do the groundwork, but the decisive stage in defining development is clearly political.

Another theme for Indo-European dialogue, and one that fits into the same context, is the character of globalisation. Is globalisation of the economy a black-and-white, "all or nothing" question, as orthodox, neo-liberal economic theorists seem to be saying, or is it possible to be selective in this respect? The slogan used in some circles in India "yes to silicon chips, no to potato chips" seems amusing and trivial, but it contains a profound question concerning the fundamental character of globalisation. Can Europe, India or why not Finland curb and guide globalisation in their own cases, or would that conflict with the principles enshrined in the Uruguay Round? What is the correct balance between the power of the state and market forces in a globalised national economy?

The third cluster of questions relating to the same theme concerns regional integration. What role do regional systems like the EU, South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or indeed Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), play in globalisation of the economy? Does the road to globalisation go via or bypass them? Or is it possible that economic globalisation goes hand-in-hand with regional cooperation?

In response to those questions, globally acceptable answers resting firmly on a cornerstone of democracy will soon have to be formulated. Only then will we be able to reply to the questions that citizens in all countries are putting to their political leaders in increasingly sharp tones. Those questions seem different in Europe and India, but relate at base to the same things, a more equitable distribution of wealth and welfare.

In most European countries the question bears on the future of the welfare state. The basic theme in this context is the implementation of social justice. In undemocratic systems, rulers can close their eyes and refuse to listen. That is impossible in democratic systems. In spite of all the contrasts between us that geography and history have caused and our occasional divergences of opinion, a democratic tradition binds Europe and India and forces us to meet the challenges of our times together.