"Berliner Rede" lecture by President of the Republic Martti Ahtisaari

at Hotel Adlon, Berlin on 26.4.1998

 

CHANGE CHALLENGING EUROPE IN AN ERA OF GLOBALISATION
- SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE CASTING LADLE

I thank Federal President Herzog and the organisers for the honour of being invited to present the second lecture in the Berliner Rede series at this respected forum. A divided Berlin is history. The organisers of this function have created a sense of affinity in the city. The new Berlin is being built into a metropolis of a uniting Europe.

 

The first Berliner Rede lecture by President Herzog one year ago shook German society. In it, he called ingrained patterns of thinking into question and proposed practical solutions to revitalise the economy and society. It was a speech that left no one cold.

 

Change in Europe and change in Germany are linked together. The strength of German democracy is a consequence of the country’s ability to take an honest look at the past and bear responsibility for the whole of Europe.

 

I now want to present my Finnish assessment of European security and of the continent’s opportunities for cooperation in the era of globalisation. Security and cooperation are in the casting ladle in Europe. The Cold War is over, but a new security order has not been completed. A critical stage is now in progress. We stall have to make our final escape from a world of paralysing fear and deterrents. Only thus will we be able to build anything new.

 

The European security situation has decisively changed. There is no threat of a major war. A security order based on a balance of power is history in Europe.

 

Economic globalisation has sprung from liberalisation of trade and investment flows, coupled with technological development. This development is creating large trade and currency areas. Economic growth has taken off on various continents; hundreds of millions of people have rapidly escaped from poverty, even though the development is not balanced. Global interdependence is now a reality. Europe could become a central actor in the new world order. It must be able to offer more original economic and social models. As a multicultural, integrated community in the process of renewing itself, we are well-placed to do that.

 

The fate of Finland has been decisively linked with relations between Germany and Russia/the Soviet Union in this century. With the Cold War behind us and as a result of integration, this situation has changed. The hostile features are disappearing from competition between nation-states and making way for constructive regulation. States need each other to safeguard the wellbeing of their citizens. This is of decisive importance from the perspective of European stability. Thus the historical foundation on which Western European unification has been built -- democracy and mutual dependence -- extends to the entire continent.

 

Unprecedented opportunities are presenting themselves as the new millennium dawns. Whether or not we are able to avail ourselves of this situation depends on us.

 

 

For us Finns, Germany is not a remote part of Europe. Finland is still Martin Luther country. Germany is our most important trade partner and one of the sources of our cultural heritage.

 

The distance between Finland and Germany grew as a consequence of the Second World War. Decisions made by the states that had emerged victorious from the conflict contributed significantly to this. The route through the Baltic States was cut. Soviet power in countries on the shores of the Baltic Sea sustained tension and prevented natural interaction.

 

After the war, the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union was decisive from the perspective of our country’s international position. During the Cold War, we managed that relationship by using a combination of foreign-policy restraint and diplomatic initiative. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union emerged in 1948 in the difficult geopolitical situation of the post-war years, and it limited our freedom of action. As such, there was no alternative to signing the treaty, but President Paasikivi managed to have its contents formulated more bearably. When the treaty is looked at in retrospect, however, it is paradoxical that it also served as a buffer that inhibited the Soviet Union. An example of the way in which relations were managed was President Kekkonen’s 1969 initiative concerning a European security and cooperation conference. This move countered the Soviet Union’s unilateral security conference plan and laid the groundwork for the CSCE summit in Helsinki in 1975.

 

The goal of our policy of neutrality was to avoid ending up on the Soviet side against the Western countries. This applied in particular to the Soviet Union’s attempts to pressure Finland into recognising the GDR. Finland’s policy of neutrality took shape under the pressure of the German question. After the Berlin four-power agreement in 1971, Finland took the initiative by proposing negotiations to both Bonn and East Berlin. By doing so, we anticipated the course that development would follow and were able to manage pressures to recognise the GDR prematurely. Finland established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR in the early months of 1972. The first time that representatives of both German states sat side-by-side at an international conference was at the CSCE preparatory meeting in Finland in 1972.

 

In 1990, twenty year later and after the Cold War had ended, Finland rescinded the outdated obligations of the Paris Peace Treaty. After the so-called 2+4 agreement and a few days before the reunification of Germany, Finland declared unilaterally that the military restrictions in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty were no longer in force. In the same conjunction, President Koivisto pointed out that the references to Germany in the treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union were outdated. Had we not acted thus, "swiftly but quietly" as the Frankfurter Allgemeine put it at the time, the restrictions on Finnish sovereignty would have continued, Finland would have remained an unapportioned item when the Cold War estate was being wound up.

 

Through the European Union, small states are able to influence decision-making on a basis of equality. If we had not joined the Union in 1995, we would have been relegated to the role of bystanders as a new Europe was being built. In conjunction with our accession, our special northern circumstances were recognised.

 

The relationship between Finland and Russia has become a natural one of good neighbourliness. President Yeltsin deserves a significant amount of the credit for this. During his visit to Finland in 1992 he laid a wreath at a monument marking the graves of Finnish soldiers in Helsinki and referred in his speech to the bitter pages in the history of relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. He continued:

 

"Let the historians study all of the matters associated with the birth of conflicts. I say straight that in those days there were outright attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of an independent Finland and that there were far-reaching motives involved. As President of Russia I can assure you in the name of the people that such deeds will never again cast gloom over Russia’s relations with Finland. We have disavowed them finally and for ever."

 

During my 1994 visit to Moscow President Yeltsin condemned Stalin’s attack on Finland in 1939.

 

Yeltsin’s comment on one of the most painful episodes in our history was of great psychological significance for the Finns. An open examination of history was important also for the Russians, who only now in the 1990s have been able to acquaint themselves honestly with their own people’s history as it emerges from behind the truths of communism. A critical assessment of history is essential for all peoples.

 

The ending of the Cold War shaped the positions of Finland and Germany in the same direction. Our international environment changed decisively: a Russia seeking its roots and reforming rose from the ruins of the Soviet empire. The Baltic States are again independent and a free Poland is a reunited Germany’s neighbour. Confrontation between East and West ended in both Central and Northern Europe. That created a situation in which the preconditions for Finland’s accession to membership of the European Union were met.

 

However, the work of building a lasting European security order is still incomplete.

 

A greater and greater responsibility resides with a policy of stability: with European economic and political unification. Enlargement of the European Union and the emergence of the euro area are in a key position here. There must not be any forgotten countries in Europe. The Union’s doors are open for all European states that meet the requirements of the founding treaties.

 

Post-Cold War expansion of the European Union began in the North in 1995. Now it is continuing eastwards. The accession of three EFTA countries to the EU was a short step in the economic sense, but politically a long one. The inclusion in the Union of the new democracies will be a time-consuming process in its economic and social aspects, but it is a matter than has already been politically decided.

 

The European Union is by far Russia’s most important trade partner. Very nearly half of Russia’s foreign trade is with the EU. The new Russia is considerably more dependent on foreign trade than the Soviet Union ever was.

 

The characteristic feature of the Russian political system is the paramount position of the President. Nevertheless, the country is evolving into one comprised of regions, a tendency that has been strengthened by the direct election of governors. That has also led to the emergence of an influential upper chamber of the legislature.

 

The regions have gained greater freedom of action, but difference between them in economic development have increased. Some regions have been showing growth figures for several years now, but the great majority remain caught in a vicious circle of falling output and slumping investment. No rapid change in this development is in sight and a significant proportion of the population is living in a difficult economic plight.

 

The Finnish Government has proposed that the European Union adopt a policy on what we call the Northern Dimension. This is a concept that groups together measures by means of which the perspective in the EU is being broadened. It means an increasingly tangible European dimension for Russia. This is founded on a strong and growing economic dependence, which best finds expression in the traffic flows across the Baltic Sea and the growing volume of energy that Europe needs to import. Europe’s future gas requirements can best be satisfied with Russia’s aid. The market for the gas resources in the northern parts of Russia is in Europe. Economic interests are intertwined in a way that promotes stability.

 

Nowhere is economic interdependence as significant for strengthening security in Europe as in the Baltic Sea region. In this development, the importance of the EU’s presence and of enlargement is central. A guarantee of a future for the Russian-speaking people of Estonia and Latvia who lack citizenship is inherent in these countries’ accession to EU membership. European norms require fair treatment for minorities. Nor can I imagine anything that would be more conducive to a stable future, in a climate of European cooperation, for the Kaliningrad region than EU enlargement.

 

Finland’s and the other Nordic countries’ trade with the Baltic States and our investments there have grown enormously. Whereas in the early 1990s Finnish interest was, for understandable reasons, mainly focused on Estonia, it now takes in all three Baltic States. An important area of concentration is improving border controls in those countries.

 

I was recently in Ukraine. We know well what a difficult history the Ukrainian people and their fertile country have experienced. Ukraine’s place is in an expanding Europe. The country is on the way towards a market economy, but it needs support and friends. It needs them from everywhere, also from Russia. Ukraine needs good trade ties in all directions.

 

European security must be founded more and more on the stability that economic and political integration is creating today. In this the European Union is the anchor. Increasing the military security of the continent should depend on defensive solutions and on a quantity of armament that is being reduced in a balanced manner. At the same time, every country has the right to choose its own security policy.

 

Finland has opted not to participate in military alliances. Our decision is based on historical experience and deliberation in the light of our security policy. Our position has been strengthened and our security policy supports stability in the Baltic Sea region and also more broadly in Europe. We are participating in peacekeeping operations in, for example, Bosnia and Macedonia, we are cooperating with NATO and we are developing the EU’s common foreign and security policy.

 

Europe’s security institutions have been adapted to the new era. The OSCE is still the only European body in which all of the states of Europe, in addition to the USA and Canada, are represented. The re-shaping of NATO with the emphasis on crisis-management tasks is a central step in the creation of a new security architecture. At the same time, NATO is expanding and is open to all European democracies. The cooperation that has commenced between the reforming NATO and Russia is an essential component of the new security order. As development continues in this direction, the preconditions for a European security area founded on interdependence and for large-scale reduction of arsenals will be satisfied.

 

The peacekeeping and stabilisation operation implemented in the former Yugoslavia -- and which will continue for years to come -- is the most concrete example of the opportunities for military cooperation that have opened up in the new Europe. Here, we come to the core of security-related development in our continent. It is important that we continue to develop security arrangements of this kind. That includes effective and practical cooperation between all of the central security- and stability-producing organisations both in the planning stage and on the crisis scene.

 

The United States has made a central contribution when the command capabilities and strength of NATO have been used in the most demanding crisis-management operation to date, the one in Bosnia. NATO is a central body, because in it the Atlantic and European inputs are fitted together. What is in harmony with that is that the European Union together with the Western European Union build a credible capability and carry the responsibility that belongs to it in European conflict prevention and crisis management. The Treaty of Amsterdam offers the ingredients of an effective security role for the European Union.

 

New security risks are a reality in Europe. Misuse of the freedoms, rights and opportunities that a borderless Europe offers must be prevented. Organised crime is a special threat to the new, fragile democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. National means are not enough. What is needed is a Union strategy for internal security and, closely linked with it, a cooperation mechanism transcending external frontiers. From the point of view of citizens, this may actually be the EU’s greatest challenge and task.

 

Therefore we also need increasingly effective controls on the European Union’s external frontiers. For Finland and Germany, both of which have borders with non-EU countries, this is an enormous task, not to speak of the candidate countries, for which it is one of the basic requirements of membership. In an altered situation, the importance of cooperation transcending the Union’s external frontiers can not be over-emphasised. Finland has positive experience of cooperation with frontier authorities in her immediate region. This cooperation is becoming closer and expanding to include the Baltic Sea and Barents Sea regions. A use for these modes of cooperation within the framework of the Northern Dimension could well be found also in other parts of the Union.

 

The effect of eastward enlargement of the EU will be seen quickly and already before membership has become a reality throughout Central Europe. In the course of the process leading to membership, the candidate states will gradually embrace the entire package of legislation. That means the normative borderline will be shifted to the eastern border of the Baltic States and Poland. A paradoxical situation has come into being. The dividing lines of the Cold War era have been removed, but yet there is talk of new barriers. The Union’s external frontier must not be made into a new Iron Curtain.

 

Effective means of maintaining internal security exist. The Union’s visa policy is part of its internal security strategy. Agreements providing for people to be taken back will have a central role in implementing changes. At the same time as we try to increase the security of the Union’s citizens by making controls on our external frontiers more effective, we are offering citizens of countries outside the Union the opportunity to move freely throughout the territory of the Union. With the aid of technology, border controls and the granting of visas can be made more efficient without risks. Finland can offer an effectively functioning model in this respect.

 

The European Union’s position in the international community will gain clarity and become more accentuated as the millennium turns. This will be a consequence of the establishment of the euro area. The decisions on the euro that will have to be made soon will create stability not only in Europe, but also in international currency markets. At the same time, the European Union will have to develop its own alternative based on social responsibility and solidarity. There is a need for this so as to keep disturbances and disequilibria in the market economy under control. It is on this basis that the EU must participate in international negotiations, whether they involve liberalisation of trade and investment or, say, protecting the environment. In addition to that, the role of the EU in resolving and managing international crises is expected to strengthen.

 

The European Union has become the most important promoter of negotiations concerning liberalisation of world trade and investment flows. It will have an increasingly decisive role as the WTO is expanded. The accession of China, but also of states like Russia and Ukraine to membership of the WTO will be of decisive important for ensuring balanced development of the world economy. Only a WTO that is sufficiently broadly based and strong can prevent trade wars and unilateral economic sanctions.

 

The European Union has initiated discussions with the aim of creating a new transatlantic marketplace together with the United States. After the euro area has been established, it will be important that the European Union conduct a currency dialogue with other major currency areas like the United States and Japan. Another question that will need to be clarified in the future is how the EU’s representation in questions concerning the euro area is to be arranged. Every country, including Finland, that holds the EU Presidency has an obligation to assume responsibility for negotiations concerning the Euro area. It will be essential to establish how cooperation in relation to currency policy can best be arranged.

 

I often ask myself why we do not use the EU even more determinedly to pursue our interests in the international community. Can it be because we fear losing our national sovereignty on the altar of common policy? But are we actually losing any sovereignty if pooling it is the only way in which Europe is able to have its voice heard in matters that would otherwise be decided by others? This point of view should not be only that of a small country.

 

My explanation for this lack of will is that we simply do not have an adequate conception of our common European security interests. We should, however, deepen our understanding of what unites us. Or is it the case that we cannot cooperate without the pressure of an external threat? As I see it, Europe does -- as a consequence of globalisation -- face one new threat: that of becoming introverted and pondering only European security problems. The European Union is needed at the negotiation table to solve global problems -- specifically for Europe’s own sake.

 

The European Union is improving its ability in this respect. Heads of government and state meeting at the Amsterdam summit reached important decisions in relation to the matter. Thus the Union’s ability to take the initiative in international politics is improving. I am convinced that as a result international cooperation to strengthen security will become markedly better, not only in Europe but also globally.

 

Through values and culture, Europeanness is present everywhere. The grievous history of our continent has, however, lessened the political significance of Europe in the present century. The economic weight of the European Union is growing, the Union is enlarging and gaining strengthen. Europe is taking its place in the world community. A balanced role founded on global cooperation is taking shape for the European Union.

 

What is decisive is that no new, hostility-provoking lines of division come into being in our continent, nor antagonisms between different population groups. A Europe standing on a foundation of military competition between nation-states was not a secure place. Nor was a divided Europe. A secure Europe is a uniting Europe of mutual dependence. A Europe of that kind is now emerging.