SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND, MR. MARTTI AHTISAARI


 



PRESENTATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND, MR. MARTTI AHTISAARI TO THE ISRAELI COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS IN JERUSALEM ON 4.10.1999


MAKING PEACE IN KOSOVO

I am pleased to have been given the opportunity to address just this audience, and in just this city. This is an especially appropriate place to assess the Kosovo crisis and evaluate its lessons. I do not need to explain to you how grave a crime against humanity is involved when one section of the population is persecuted because of its religion or ethnic background. Nor, in a country of whose language the best-known word is shalom, need I emphasise the difficulty of searching for peace or tell you how important it is to do so.

The Kosovo crisis was not just a European crisis. It aroused strong emotions and triggered a heated debate all over the world. From the outset, the main issues in the debate were whether the international community would have to resort to the use of force to defend the people of Kosovo and, if it had to, how it should go about it. Nearly four months have passed since the end of the NATO bombing campaign, but events in Kosovo are still the focus of an intense international debate on points of principle.

The scale of the debate is easier to understand when we examine the background to the crisis. A series of very dangerous signals had emanated from the Balkans during the decade now drawing to a close. The international community had repeatedly had to intervene in the face of arbitrary violence against other nationalities and minorities. Kosovo was the last straw. If the Yugoslav leadership had been given free hands to implement its plans, the region would have become a behavioural model with consequences from which all would have suffered. The example would have sent a very dubious message to other states in the region which, as prospective members of the European Union, should be treating their minorities with tolerance and understanding rather than high-handedness and violence.

Especially with a view to crisis management in the future, it is important that we examine – as carefully as possible – the lessons to be learned from the Kosovo crisis and its resolution.

The Balkan region has been in the spotlight of international attention throughout this decade. The disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resulted in four armed conflicts and immeasurable human suffering. Once again before the turn of the millennium, we had to witness what inciting hatred and intolerance can lead to.

The Kosovo crisis showed — unfortunately — that the use of force by the international community in a humanitarian intervention is not merely an academic question. It involves a serious and complex matter, to which we shall probably have to give a lot of thought also in conjunction with many future crises. How can we find common principles that the international community can follow, and which will enable us to avoid the mistakes of the past and prevent flagrant and systematic violations of human rights?

The issue of the legitimacy of using force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia revolves around two central principles of international law. On the one hand, states are sovereign in their own territories, which prevents other states from intervening in their internal affairs. On the other, human rights are universal and indivisible, and they do not depend on which state’s territory a person lives in. When an individual state flagrantly violates its own citizens’ rights, the international community has to ponder how these two principles relate to each other.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan took up this theme in a recent speech to the General Assembly. He said:

"If states bent on criminal behaviour know that frontiers are not the absolute defence, if they know that the Security Council will take action to halt crimes against humanity, then they will not embark on such a course of action in expectation of sovereign impunity."

The most important goal of humanitarian intervention is to prevent major crimes against civilians. In the case of Kosovo, the alternatives that NATO and the rest of the international community had to choose between were all bad. It was obvious that the use of force would lead to victims among the Serbs. It was equally obvious that there would be at least a temporary intensification of direct violence against the Kosovars and a stepping up of expulsions. Yet, the scale of the refugee flows caused by the frenzy of ethnic cleansing that followed the commencement of air strikes took most observers by surprise.

My own perception was and remains that the international community no longer had any other options when the air strikes began in late March. Military action had become unavoidable. The situation in Kosovo had grown intolerable. The leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not willing to accept any kind of solution that would have prevented a deepening of the crisis. Furthermore, the crisis looked set to cause instability in the whole region if it were allowed to continue. The failure of diplomatic efforts in Rambouillet and the escalating violence against the Kosovars ultimately led to force being used.

The decision to use force was taken by the NATO countries. Finland is not a member of the alliance, so we did not participate in making the decision nor in the military action that followed it. We did, however, make our views known both through our own separate statements and in those issued jointly by all members of the European Union. Our position was clear: the responsibility for the situation lay with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which had precipitated the crisis through its own actions. When I addressed the Parliament of Finland in late March, I said that ruthless violence against the civilian population of one’s own country could no longer be permitted in today’s Europe. Now I would like to add that, naturally, the same principle applies everywhere.

I regret for many reasons that the decision to undertake military measures could not be arrived at within the UN. However, it was clear that the necessary Security Council resolution could not be achieved. Nevertheless, the international community must not stand idly by and leave victims of oppressive actions without protection.

By the beginning of May the crisis had become more and more problematic for the international community. The air strikes had been in progress for several weeks, but it was increasingly obvious that they alone would not lead to a military solution. Although diplomatic efforts had already failed once and individual contacts from various quarters did not appear to be yielding results, it became necessary to step up the search for a diplomatic solution. It was at this stage that I – as a representative of the European Union – became involved in efforts to restore peace.

The suggestion that I become involved came from others. My impression is that the initiative emerged from the talks between the Americans and the Russians in Washington in early May. They considered it necessary to bring in a third party. Soon after they contacted me, I discussed the matter also with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Germany held the EU Presidency at the time and the Chancellor proposed that I represent the Union as a whole in efforts to resolve the crisis. I saw this as the only sensible solution.

Neither crises in the Balkans nor international crisis management were matters in relation to which I was a complete novice. In the service of the United Nations and especially while directing the operation that led to Namibian independence, I had gained experience of many aspects of crisis management. My personal experience of Balkan issues dated from the early half of the 1990s, when I performed a variety of tasks in efforts to solve the war in Bosnia. Naturally, I considered it my duty to agree to the request made to me in early May. However, I did not consider my prospects to be very promising.

Already during the first round of contacts, it became evident that there were substantial differences of view on the terms that might form the basis for a solution. That was what made it so important to get American, Russian and EU representatives around the same table to discuss their differences. Agreement between these three parties and through it the unity of the international community were indispensable preconditions for a peace offer that could be presented to the Yugoslav leadership and also gain acceptance.

My approach in these trilateral talks between the teams of American Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, President Yeltsin’s special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin and myself was simple: rather than becoming ensnarled in questions of prestige, we would concentrate on issues that were both practical and central. How to create the conditions in which the refugees could return safely? What kind of presence would the international community have? How would the withdrawal of the Serbian forces be effected? What would be the nature of the interim international administration installed in the region?

I had been convinced from the outset that an international presence would be credible only if it were based on contributions from the core NATO countries and also NATO-led. Otherwise the refugees would not dare to return to their homes. It was equally obvious that it would not be a traditional peacekeeping operation, but rather a much more demanding exercise like the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Eventually, also the Russians accepted these principles, or at least their core elements.

The achievement of agreement made it possible for me to go to Belgrade with Viktor Chernomyrdin in the beginning of June. Four weeks of constant hard work yielded fruit: there was not the slightest disagreement between us in Belgrade. We carefully outlined the content of the peace offer to the Yugoslav political and military leaders and, after we had replied to their questions, they withdrew to consider their response. The following day, the offer that we had brought was presented to the Serbian Parliament and the Yugoslav Federal Government, both of which accepted it. I do not know for certain just why the Yugoslav leaders accepted our offer, but I believe that a positive answer would have been considerably more difficult to obtain if the trilateral talks had failed to produce a result.

Finding a peaceful solution was, of course, only the first step in a process with the ultimate aim of stabilising Kosovo and the surrounding region. The real challenges relate to rebuilding the economy there, creating democratic administrative structures and institutions, and bringing a functioning civil society into being.

The creation of a civilian administration has been entrusted to United Nations. The task of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo is certainly not an enviable one. I am only too familiar with the problems that operations like it involve.

The arrangement of a civilian administration in Kosovo has highlighted many of the weaknesses in the present international system. Of the 4,500 police that it is estimated will be needed to restore law and order, only about 1,500 have been put in place more than two months after the commencement of the operation. Trained police, judges and officials should be at the disposal of the international community and ready for deployment at shorter notice than is now possible. That is because regrettably many crises involve so-called failed-state situations, in which the entire apparatus of civilian administration has to be rebuilt from scratch.

The biggest setback in dealing with the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis to date has been the failure of the international community to convince the Serb minority that the province is a safe place for them; indeed, most of the Serbs have fled.

There is also a need to coordinate the actions of international organisations. The operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo have shown that the effectiveness of international efforts suffers when responsibility is divided between several organisations. This has caused both duplication in efforts and gaps in coverage.

Thus the Kosovo crisis has raised more than just questions of principle. From the perspective of the international community, there are also very practical problems to be addressed.

A doctrine of humanitarian intervention can not, naturally, be formulated solely on the basis of the Kosovo crisis, but it is obvious that the events in the province will feature centrally in the debate on humanitarian intervention and crisis management for a long time to come.

I am aware that the issue of NATO’s action relative to international law is a complex one. The international community invoked humanitarian reason to legitimise its use of force. Respect for the principles of humanitarian justice is an essential part of international law. It is obvious that in the future humanitarian considerations will weigh more heavily in the balance when the international community is deliberating its actions. States have signed up to international human rights conventions, democracy has taken root in more and more countries. That is why public opinion and governments are increasingly resolute in defending these fundamental values.

It is obvious that governments which have been guilty of widespread and grave violations of human rights must not enjoy sovereign impunity to intervention by the international community. In particularly blatant cases, not even military intervention can be ruled out. Sovereignty brings not only rights, but also obligations.

Humanitarian considerations were the main reason for launching the operation in East Timor. As in Kosovo, widespread violence was in progress there and large numbers of people were being made refugees. In contrast with Kosovo, however, the UN Security Council was able to reach a consensus on the East Timor question and an agreement providing for an international presence was negotiated with the Indonesian Government.

Despite all the debate that has gone on, the international community may still face future situations involving a conflict between formal legality and political and moral legitimacy. Combining force and diplomacy will continue to be a demanding and complex task.

Neither the Kosovo crisis nor any other recent events have shaken the fundamental structures of the international political and legal order. But these structures will nevertheless have to be developed to meet the demands of the times.

The United Nations Charter permits the use of force only in self-defence or under a mandate from the Security Council. There is no reason to change that arrangement, but its effectiveness needs to be improved. It lies in the interests of the entire international community – and by no means least from the perspective of small nations – that the Security Council regain and preserve its capability as a guarantor of international peace and security.

The Security Council should strive to be consistent in its attitude to crises and conflicts. This applies both to conflicts between states and to humanitarian crises within them.

Given the limited nature of the UN’s own resources, it is also possible to authorise regional organisations or coalitions of individual states to act on behalf of the international community. That has indeed happened in recent years.

In all probability, a regional dimension of this kind will become increasingly important in the future. For that reason, liaison and cooperation between the UN and regional security systems must be improved and made to function more effectively. One of the bodies in which this work is being done is the OSCE. The organisation plans to adopt a new security charter at its next summit in Istanbul. This will set out the basic ground rules and practical modalities to be observed when institutions cooperate with each other in preventing conflicts and sorting out their aftermaths.

Our experience of Kosovo and other recent crises shows that the international system must be developed where both its legal aspect and the implementation of operations are concerned. We must strive for a system that is sustainable, balanced and consistent in its principles and which also implements operations efficiently and fruitfully.

Something that I have earlier proposed for consideration is that the International Court of Justice be asked for an advisory opinion when a crisis defies resolution. The legal view presented by the Court with all its prestige behind it could help the Security Council to find the necessary political consensus in situations where states faced the possibility of international intervention because they were no longer capable of protecting their citizens from armed violence or willing to do so.

New ideas on how to increase the efficiency of operations are likewise needed on the implementation side. I have been following with great interest the discussion on the subject of increasing the UN’s opportunities to take action to resolve both military and other types of crises. It is obvious that the organisation’s ability to act swiftly must be improved.

The Kosovo crisis and other similar humanitarian catastrophes – as now in East Timor – are difficult experiences from the point of view of the international community. However, they are most painful of all for the people whose everyday lives they touch. The loss of one’s home, violence, the deaths of relatives and other cruelties cast a long shadow over the life of an individual.

The most important lesson of the Kosovo crisis is ultimately that those political leaders who are planning ethnic cleansing and to deprive their own citizens of their fundamental rights can no longer be certain that the international community will fail to react. However, we have still a long way to go before the international community acts consistently in all comparable cases.